



Secession and Secessionist Movements

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Introduction

Secession and secessionist movements have proliferated since the end of the Second World War. The academic literature has extensively explored these movements from different aspects. To begin, scholars have developed several legal approaches to explain when and if so how secession should take place, resulting in debates about the normative basis and legality of self-determination. Normative and philosophical approaches have sought to establish a number of necessary preconditions for secession. States, according to some of these authors, should allow secession to happen when they believe that it is morally and practically acceptable. The political economy of secession and secessionist movements has been another key area of research. Debates among scholars in this area have focused on whether wealthy or poor regions are more or less likely to pursue secession, how the presence of oil resources may establish more opportunities for the groups to secede along with incentives for the state to hold onto the territory, and what role state capacity and movement capabilities play in secessionist dynamics. Scholars have also emphasized economic approaches to the study of secession that highlight the costs and benefits of staying in the union compared to seceding. Others have studied secessionism from an international perspective and have particularly focused on exploring the impact of external kin on secessionist movements and on why and how self-determination movements obtain international recognition. International approaches have also explored the roles of ethnic ties and vulnerability in stimulating and curbing secessionist movements. Other scholars have focused on institutional approaches by exploring how different domestic and international institutions have shaped secessionist conflicts. In particular, research in this area has explored the relationship between democracy and secession, institutional legacies, and the role of autonomy and lost autonomy on separatism. Scholars have also examined the strategic choices and behaviors used by both secessionist groups (violence vs. nonviolence) and by states (concession and repression), and relatedly how reputational concerns for resolve and setting precedents shape state behavior toward secessionists. Some research shows that most states are more likely to fight against secessionist movements than to grant them concessions, particularly states facing multiple (potential) separatists. However, other scholars have challenged these claims, and shown that states can use organizational lines to grant some concessions to secessionist groups without damaging their reputations. Looking toward solutions, some scholars have emphasized institutional solutions, such as consociationalism, and still others have looked to international organizations to resolve secessionist conflicts, while skeptics have suggested that approaches like partition are often the only way forward. Finally, there are several new datasets for studying secession and secessionist movements, including All Minorities at Risk (AMAR), Family EPR, SDM, and others.

Normative Theories of Secession

Beran 1984 presents his liberal normative theory of secession, which Birch 1984 criticizes. Beran 1988 responds that Birch 1984 is not sufficiently liberal or theoretical. Buchanan 1991 provides a complete normative theory of secession. Buchanan 1997 identifies the deficiencies in existing theories of secession and offers some remedies for them.

Beran, Harry. "A Liberal Theory of Secession." *Political Studies* 32.1 (1984): 21–31.

Beran introduces a liberal normative theory of secession, in which he asserts that secession should be allowed if it is effectively desired by a territorially concentrated group and is morally and practically possible.

Beran, Harry. "More Theory of Secession: A Response to Birch." *Political Studies* 36.2 (1988): 316–323.

In this article, Beran responds and claims that Birch's theory of secession is neither sufficiently liberal nor theoretical.

Birch, Anthony H. "Another Liberal Theory of Secession." *Political Studies* 32.4 (1984): 596–602.

Birch criticizes Beran's normative theory of secession as incomplete and indefinite. He proposes an alternative theory of secession in which he asserts that secession from a liberal democratic state can be justified when four specific conditions exist.

Buchanan, Allen. *Secession. The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec*. Boulder, San Francisco. Oxford: Westview Press, 1991.

Buchanan outlines a comprehensive theory of secession with historical examples. He stresses that groups with restricted rights tend to secede, particularly when they are oppressed by other racial or ethnic groups or faced with external occupation.

Buchanan, Allen. "Theories of Secession." *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 26.1 (1997): 31–61.

Buchanan articulates the deficiencies in theories of secession and suggests some remedies for them.

Legal Approaches to Secession

Musgrave 2000 reviews overarching legal issues involving self-determination, particularly since the establishment of the UN. Raič 2002 also revisits the right to self-determination and examines its significance for the creation of new states. Horowitz 2003 contends that the alleged right to secede is ill considered. Pavkovic and Radan 2007 outlines secession in legal theory and practice. Crawford 2006 evaluates the principles for recognizing new states and analyzes the role of secession in state formation.

Crawford, James. *The Creation of States in International Law*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Crawford analyzes the principles of recognizing new states and the role of secession in state formation.

Horowitz, Donald L. "The Cracked Foundations of the Right to Secede." *Journal of Democracy* 14.2 (2003): 5–17.

The author argues that the alleged right to secede, held by ethnic groups and derived from a reinterpretation of the principle of the self-determination of nations, would be a reversal of existing international law, and is poorly considered. Among other reasons, it is noted that a right to secede is likely to dampen efforts at coexistence in the undivided state, including federalism or regional autonomy.

Musgrave, Thomas D. *Self-Determination and National Minorities*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

This book examines the relationship between minority rights and self-determination in international law and outlines the core legal issues involving self-determination, particularly since the creation of the UN.

Pavkovic, Aleksandar, and Peter Radan. *Creating New States: Theory and Practice of Secession*. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2007

The authors discuss legal, political, and social processes in secession practice by exploring eight case studies. The book also outlines normative and positive theories of secessions.

Raič, David. *Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination*. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002.

Raič discusses the right of self-determination and its significance for the formation of new states from a legal perspective.

Political Economy Approaches

Political economy approaches to secession and secessionist movements have focused, inter alia, on whether the regions with poverty or with economic wealth are more or less likely to call for and pursue secession. One theory proposes that secession is more likely among backward groups within backward regions; others focus on the incentives of rich regions to secede. Some scholars have emphasized the effect of natural resources and disasters on separatism as well as the cost-benefit tradeoffs of staying in a union versus seceding.

Poverty and Power

Horowitz 1981 suggests that secession is more prevalent in backward groups within backward regions. Dietrich 2014 argues that both “subject-centered” and “justice as reciprocity” theories fail to provide sufficient support against secession of wealthy regions. Brown 2010 evaluates which socioeconomic circumstances are more likely to lead to secession. Bartkus 1999 applies a cost-benefit framework to secession. Jenne, et al. 2007 demonstrates that minorities tend to seek secession when they have greater power relative to the government. Likewise, Cederman, et al. 2010 also shows that the capacity of groups facilitates ethnonationalist rebellion. Sorens 2005 examines risk factors for secessionism at the local and regional level in advanced democracies, and finds that regions with a recent independence history, higher income level, and larger population size tend to seek secession. Vadlamannati 2011 stresses that economic and political discrimination leads to conflict outbreaks.

Bartkus, Viva Ona. *The Dynamic of Secession*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Using a comparative study of historical secession cases, Bartkus develops a general explanation for the emergence of secession that specifies the costs and benefits of secession.

Brown, Graham K. “The Political Economy of Secessionism: Inequality, Identity and the State.” *Bath Papers in International Development* 9 (2010): 1–29.

Brown evaluates several propositions regarding socioeconomic circumstances that promote secessionism and political institutions that can conciliate it. He finds that ethnic diversity has a strong predictive role in explaining secession.

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min. “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel? New Data and Analysis.” *World Politics* 62.1 (2010): 87–119.

The authors use a new dataset on ethnic power relations (EPR) and examine the incidences of armed conflict as the result of ethnonationalist demands to state power. They find that ethnic groups tend to get involved in conflict with the government when they are excluded from state power, when they have higher mobilizing capacity, and when they have experienced conflict in the past.

Dietrich, Frank. “Secession of the Rich: A Qualified Defence.” *Politics, Philosophy & Economics* 13.1 (2014): 62–81.

Frank explores “subject-centered” and “justice as reciprocity” theories and argues that both theories do not provide sufficient support for the case against the secession of affluent groups. To be specific, “justice as reciprocity” theories fail to justify restrictions on exit rights, while “subject-centered” theories fail to account for special duties toward compatriots. The author also stresses that separatists have moral duties to dissolve a political union fairly.

Horowitz, Donald L. “Patterns of Ethnic Separatism.” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 23.2 (1981): 165–195.

Horowitz develops a two-by-two matrix that classifies groups and regional economies as backward and advanced, and stresses that secession is most prevalent among backward groups within backward regions.

Jenne, Erin K., Stephen M. Saideman, and Will Lowe. “Separatism as a Bargaining Posture: The Role Of Leverage in Minority Radicalization.” *Journal of Peace Research* 44.5 (2007): 539–558.

The authors ask why some minority groups pursue affirmative action whereas other groups demand secession or territorial autonomy under similar circumstances. They argue that the relative power of groups plays a critical role in the severity of their demands, and makes secession more likely.

Sorens, Jason. "The Cross-Sectional Determinants of Secessionism in Advanced Democracies." *Comparative Political Studies* 38.3 (2005): 304–326.

Sorens examines the risk factors for secessionism at the local and regional level in advanced democracies. He finds that regions with a recent history of independence, larger populations, and higher income levels are more likely to support secessionism.

Vadlamannati, Krishna Chaitanya. "Why Indian Men Rebel? Explaining Armed Rebellion in Northeastern States of India, 1970–2007." *Journal of Peace Research* 48.5 (2011): 605–619.

Vadlamannati quantitatively explores whether economic and political discrimination and deprivation account for armed conflict incidence across nine northeastern states of India from 1970–2007, and finds that poverty and economic and political discrimination explain conflict outbreaks.

Natural Resources and Disasters

Lujala 2009 finds that secessionist conflicts in areas with hydrocarbon production are the most severe conflicts. Sorens 2011 maintains that rebel looting of mineral resources is usually counterproductive among the ethnic groups that are territorially concentrated. Hunziker and Cederman 2017 demonstrates that oil resources have a significant and robust impact on the probability of secessionist conflict. Gehring and Schneider 2020 argues that the success of a secessionist party is positively associated with relative regional income. Billon, et al. 2007 introduce a framework to examine the impact of natural disasters on armed conflicts and find that political trends before natural disasters have a key role in conflict outcomes during the post-disaster period.

Billon, Philippe Le, and Arno Waizenegger. "Peace in the Wake of Disaster? Secessionist Conflicts and the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami." *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 32.3 (2007): 411–427.

The authors examine the effect of natural disasters on armed conflicts. They particularly focus on the secessionist conflicts in Aceh and Sri Lanka after the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean. While the conflict ended in the former, it escalated in the latter. Drawing from diverse literatures, the paper presents a conceptual framework to explore the effect of natural disasters on armed conflicts and stresses that spatial dimensions are important to explain this effect.

Gehring, Kai, and Stephan A. Schneider. "Regional Resources and Democratic Secessionism." *Journal of Public Economics* 181 (2020): 1040–1073.

The authors examine the effect of resources on secessionist conflicts in established democracies and demonstrate that the success of a secessionist party is positively associated with regional income.

Hunziker, Philipp, and Lars-Erik Cederman. "No Extraction without Representation: The Ethno-Regional Oil Curse and Secessionist Conflict." *Journal of Peace Research* 54.3 (2017): 365–381.

By using a novel identification strategy, Hunziker and Cederman reexamine whether oil leads to conflict and find that previous work has underestimated the magnitude of the conflict-inducing effect of oil production. Their findings demonstrate that oil resources have a significant and robust impact on the probability of secessionist conflict.

Lujala, Paivi. "Deadly Combat over Natural Resources: Gems, Petroleum, Drugs, and the Severity of Armed Civil Conflict." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53.1 (2009): 50–71.

Lujala empirically explores the effect of natural resources on the severity of armed civil conflict, and finds that secessionist conflicts in areas with hydrocarbon production are the most severe.

Sorens, Jason. "Mineral Production, Territory, and Ethnic Rebellion: The Role of Rebel Constituencies." *Journal of Peace Research* 48.5 (2011): 571–585.

Sorens maintains that rebel looting of mineral resources is usually counterproductive among the ethnic groups that are territorially concentrated since it is more likely to impose negative externalities on the rebel constituency. However, the presence of local minerals tends to produce secessionist politics among such groups.

Economic Approaches to Secession

Buchanan and Faith 1987 introduces a theory of internal exit. Graziosi 2007 criticizes their theory of internal exit on the charge that it has failed to evaluate the impact of secession on gross private income. Alesina, et al. 1997 builds on the internal exit theory and discusses the costs and benefits of leaving versus staying in a country (or union) for regions. Bolton and Roland 1997 introduces a model of the unification and breakup of nations. Gradstein 2004 discusses whether allowing minorities to secede brings gains in efficiency. Alesina, et al. 1995 discusses the costs and benefits of political separatism. Berkowitz 1997 explores the possible relationship between changes in regional income levels and the demand for secession in peripheral regions. Bordignon and Brusco 2001 explores whether a federal constitution should allow peaceful secession. Desmet, et al. 2011 examines when nations tend to break up and when they are likely to be stable. Madiès, et al. 2018 examines legal, theoretical, and empirical aspects of secessionist conflicts. Hierro and Queralt 2021 tests how anticipated trade, insurance, and fiscal shocks from independence structure individual attitudes on secession and present an individual-level materialistic approach to the study of secession.

Alesina, Alberto, Roberto Perotti, and Enrico Spolaore. "Together or Separately? Issues on the Costs and Benefits of Political And Fiscal Unions." *European Economic Review* 39.3–4 (1995): 751–758.

The authors outline some of the costs and benefits of political separatism, and reconcile some disagreements between "normative" and "empirical" economic models.

Alesina, Alberto, and Enrico Spolaore. "On the Number and Size of Nations." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 112.4 (1997): 1027–1056.

The authors discuss the tradeoff between the costs of heterogenous populations and benefits of large jurisdictions. Their model also suggests that democratization brings secession.

Berkowitz, Daniel. "Regional Income and Secession: Center-Periphery Relations in Emerging Market Economies." *Regional Science and Urban Economics* 27.1 (1997): 17–45.

Berkowitz examines the association between changes in regional income levels and secessionist demands in the periphery. The author's model highlights several conditions under which the periphery's incentive to secede decreases or increases, and discusses the model's implications for Bashkortostan, Chechnya, Tatarstan, and Sakha.

Bolton, Patrick, and Gerard Roland. "The Breakup of Nations: A Political Economy Analysis." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 112.4 (1997): 1057–1090.

The authors present a model of the unification and breakup of nations. They find that when efficiency benefits from unification are relatively low, separation is likely to happen in equilibrium. However, the incentives for separation vanish when all factors of production become perfectly mobile.

Bordignon, Massimo, and Sandro Brusco. "Optimal Secession Rules." *European Economic Review* 45.10 (2001): 1811–1834.

Bordignon and Brusco ask if the constitution of a federation should permit peaceful secession and underline the circumstances under which a constitution optimally should cover provisions for secession. The authors also demonstrate that it is difficult to preserve federation under asymmetric information, which renders secessionist war likely.

Buchanan, James M., and Roger L. Faith. "Secession and the Limits of Taxation: Toward a Theory of Internal Exit." *The American Economic Review* 77.5 (1987): 1023–1031.

The authors outline the limits of taxation and formulate a theory of internal exit. They specify secession as "internal exit" based on the economies of scale in public good provisions.

Desmet, K., M. Le Breton, I. Ortuño-Ortín, and S. Weber. "The Stability and Breakup of Nations: A Quantitative Analysis." *Journal of Economic Growth* 16.3 (2011): 183–213.

In this paper, the authors evaluate the breakup and stability of nations by focusing on the tradeoff between costs of greater cultural heterogeneity and benefits from the provision of public goods. They estimate monetary gains from EU membership and suggest that their model can explain the breakup of Yugoslavia.

Gradstein, Mark. "Political Bargaining in a Federation: Buchanan Meets Coase." *European Economic Review* 48.5 (2004): 983–999.

Gradstein evaluates the argument that freedom of secession can protect the interests of minorities and give them an incentive to enter a federation. He argues that granting minorities an option to secede can lead to distortions of political choices that individual regions make to further their bargaining positions, which results in an inefficient allocation of resources in federations, whereas restraining chances for secession brings efficiency.

Graziosi, Grégoire Rota. "Secession and the Limits of Taxation: Toward a Theory of Internal Exit: Comment." *American Economic Review* 97.1 (2007): 534–538.

Graziosi asserts that Buchanan and Faith 1987 have not considered the impact of secession on the gross private income, correct this error and extend their analysis.

Hierro, Maria Jose, and Didac Queralt. "The Divide Over Independence: Explaining Preferences for Secession in an Advanced Open Economy." *American Journal of Political Science* 65.2 (2021): 422–442

The authors test whether insurance, anticipated trade, and fiscal shocks from independence shape individual preferences on secession by using an original survey data from Catalonia. They find that individuals who work in sectors and companies specialized in the host state market are against secession, while those who are specialized in foreign markets do not oppose independence. Their findings also demonstrate that long-term unemployed individuals' exclusion from public insurance makes them more likely to prefer for secession. Better skilled respondents also tend to support secession.

Madiès, T., G. Rota-Grasiozi, J -P. Tranchant, and C. Trépiér. "The Economics of Secession: A Review of Legal, Theoretical, and Empirical Aspects." *Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics* 154.19 (2018): 1–18.

The article reviews theoretical, legal, and empirical aspects of secessions from an economic perspective and discusses Brexit and secessionist movements in Catalonia and Scotland.

The International System and Secession

Secession has also been analyzed from an international perspective. Studies have primarily looked at the international relations of secessionist movements. While the vulnerability argument has suggested that the lack of support from some countries to secessionist movements in other countries stems from their vulnerability to the internal conflicts in their own territories, the ethnic ties argument has

stressed their importance in shaping how state leaders respond toward external secessionist movements. International recognition has been a key research area in which most research has demonstrated that unilateral secession rarely if ever becomes internationally recognized and legitimate. Others have argued that great power contestation shapes the extent and timing of international recognition for unilateral secession. Some research has also explored the effect of international recognition on mass opinion among groups in conflict. The studies have also explored the influence of external kin and actors on secessionist movements. Finally, some studies have traced changes in the international system to explain the emergence of secession and its prevalence in different eras.

International Relations of Secessionism

Jackson and Rosberg 1982 discusses the so-called “vulnerability argument” that states are reluctant to recognize secessionist movements in other states because they are also vulnerable to secessionism in their own territories, and fear reciprocal interference. Saideman 1997 criticizes the vulnerability argument and discusses the utility of an “ethnic ties” perspective. Fazal and Griffiths 2014 concentrates on changes in the international system to explain why some groups aspire to gain independence. Beardsley, et al. 2017 argues that direct diplomatic actions by the United Nations diminish the probability of self-determination movements escalating to armed conflicts, whereas military force and sanctions by this organization has the reverse effect. Huddleston 2020 argues that conceptualizing international sovereignty as a dynamic and continuous process can help us to better understand it.

Beardsley, Kyle, David E. Cunningham, and Peter B. White. “Resolving Civil Wars before They Start: The UN Security Council and Conflict Prevention in Self-Determination Disputes.” *British Journal of Political Science* 47.3 (2017): 675–697.

The authors explore the content of United Nation Security Council resolutions to see if this organization diminishes the likelihood of the self-determination movements escalating into civil war, and find that the diplomatic actions taken to directly address the disputes decrease the possibility of armed conflict, while sanctions and military force exhibit indirect preventive effects.

Fazal, Tanisha M., and Ryan D. Griffiths. “Membership Has Its Privileges: The Changing Benefits of Statehood.” *International Studies Review* 16.1 (2014): 79–106.

Fazal and Griffiths maintain that security, normative, and economic changes in the international system have made secessionism more likely, since these changes have increased the benefits of independence more than its costs.

Huddleston, R. Joseph. “Continuous Recognition: A Latent Variable Approach to Measuring International Sovereignty of Self-Determination Movements.” *Journal of Peace Research* 57.6 (2020): 789–800.

Huddleston maintains that conceptualization of international sovereignty as a changing and continuous process, mirrored in foreign policy decisions short of legal recognition can make our understanding of it better. His findings demonstrate that diplomatic recognition, extant violence, separatist victory, and sour relations between third-party countries and incumbent states tend to positively influence latent sovereignty of separatist groups, whereas concern that sovereignty will create a precedent negatively influences it.

Jackson, Robert H., and Carl G. Rosberg. “Why Africa’s Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood.” *World Politics* 35.1 (1982): 1–24.

The authors develop the argument that states have a common interest in supporting international institutions and rules to prevent secessionism because they are vulnerable to secessionism. The authors demonstrate that African states have tended to support international rules over secessionist demands in other states, since they also have secessionist problems at home.

Saideman, Stephen M. “Explaining the International Relations of Secessionist Conflicts: Vulnerability Versus Ethnic Ties.” *International Organization* 51.4 (1997): 721–753.

Saideman challenges the vulnerability argument that states are unwilling to support external secessionist movements because they are themselves vulnerable to separatism. The author instead argues that ethnic diversity within states is a determining factor for which policies their leaders will formulate toward secessionist conflicts in other countries. This “ethnic ties” argument postulates that state leaders express support for secessionist movements that have ethnic ties with their supporters in domestic politics. The author empirically evaluates this argument in three secessionist conflicts: the fall of Yugoslavia, the Nigerian civil war, and the crisis in Congo.

External Kin and Actors

Saideman 1997 argues that ethnic diversity within their states is an important factor for state leaders determining what policies they are likely to develop toward secessionist movements in other countries. Cederman, et al. 2009 develops a triadic model that evaluates the ethnic kin effect on the probability of internal conflict at both domestic and transnational levels of analysis. Cederman, et al. 2013a presents a theory that focuses on ethnonationalism and that shows how the relationship between group identities and inequalities produces violence. Cederman, et al. 2013b demonstrates that the transnational ethnodemographic balance and conflict onset are linked in a curvilinear manner.

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Luc Girardin, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. "Ethnonationalist Triads: Assessing the Influence of Kin Groups on Civil Wars." *World Politics* 61.3 (2009): 403–437.

The authors address two blind spots in civil war literature: one relating to underaggregation and the other to overaggregation. They introduce a triadic model to capture the ethnic kin effect on the likelihood of internal conflict at both domestic and transnational levels of analysis. Their model treats ethnonationalist civil war as a disaggregated phenomenon with connections across state borders. Their new geographic data provide evidence for the effect of ethnic kin on the likelihood of internal conflict.

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Halvard Buhaug. *Inequality, Grievances, and Civil War*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013a.

The authors maintain that political and economic inequalities produce grievances, which may lead to civil war. They develop a theoretical framework that emphasizes ethnonationalism and demonstrates how the links between group identities and inequalities lead to the use of violence.

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Idean Salehyan, and Julian Wucherpfennig. "Transborder Ethnic Kin and Civil War." *International Organization* 67.2 (2013b): 389–410.

The authors ask why some ethnic groups with transborder ethnic kin (TEK) that face domestic marginalization rebel, while others do not. They link the transnational ethnodemographic balance to conflict onset in a curvilinear manner: The risk of conflict rises within the middle range TEK size, and is lower among those with large TEK groups, provided that they are in control of their own state.

Saideman, Stephen M. "Explaining the International Relations of Secessionist Conflicts: Vulnerability Versus Ethnic Ties." *International Organization* 51.4 (1997): 721–753.

Saideman maintains that ethnic diversity within states is an essential factor that state leaders take into consideration when they formulate policies toward secessionist conflicts in other countries. His ethnic ties argument demonstrates that state leaders support secessionist movements if the ethnic groups involved in these movements have strong kin group in these states.

International Recognition of Secession

Fabry 2010 examines the history of state recognition while Fabry 2012 finds that there is limited empirical evidence that unilateral secession tends to become internationally legitimate. Coggins 2011 presents a model of state emergence. Siroky, et al. 2020 develops a new model of international recognition, and examines the dynamics of international recognition for unilateral secession while showing how great power contestation shapes the extent and timing of such recognition. Mirilovic and Siroky 2015, Mirilovic and Siroky 2017, and Mirilovic and Siroky 2020 show how transnational religious ties and internal religious regulations have influenced international recognition of the Palestinian Authority and of Israel, Kosovo, and Western Sahara respectively. Shelef and Zeira 2017 shows that the international recognition of statehood by the UN General Assembly shapes mass attitudes of groups in conflict toward territorial compromise.

Coggins, Bridget. "Friends in High Places: International Politics and the Emergence of States from Secessionism." *International Organization* 65.3 (2011): 433–467.

Coggins explores state birth in international relations, introduces an international-level model of state emergence, and finds that external politics shapes state emergence in the international system.

Fabry, Mikulas. *Recognizing States: International Society and the Establishment of New States Since 1776*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

This book examines recognition of new states, drawing upon English school theorists, and argues that for the past two hundred years state recognition has been tied to the idea of the self-determination of peoples. The author finds that ad hoc recognition is likely to continue into the future.

Fabry, Mikulas. "The Contemporary Practice of State Recognition: Kosovo, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Their Aftermath." *Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity* 40.5 (2012): 661–676.

Fabry examines state recognition in cases of Kosovo, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia and argues that there is limited empirical evidence that unilateral secession tends to become internationally legitimate.

Mirilovic, Nikola, and David S. Siroky. "Two States in the Holy Land? International Recognition and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict." *Politics and Religion* 8.2 (2015): 263–285.

Mirilovic and Siroky argue that two reasons, transnational religious ties and domestic religious regulations, explain why states extend or withhold international recognition to state-like entities. While states with transnational religious ties to a contested territory are prone to recognize the territory, states that have a tight domestic regulation of religion tend to refuse to extend international recognition. The argument is assessed on the disputed recognitions of Israel and Palestine.

Mirilovic, Nikola, and David S. Siroky. "International Recognition and Religion: A Quantitative Analysis of Kosovo's Contested Status." *International Interactions* 43.4 (2017): 668–687.

Mirilovic and Siroky ask why some states extend international recognition to state-like entities, while others refuse to do so. Examining Kosovo, the article demonstrates how two pathways, transnational religious ties and internal religious regulations, have shaped international recognition dynamics.

Mirilovic, Nikola, and David S. Siroky. "International Recognition, Religion, and the Status of Western Sahara." *Acta Politica* (2020): 1–19.

Mirilovic and Siroky argue that religion, at both international and domestic levels, accounts for international recognition of state-like entities, illustrating the theory by examining the international recognition dynamics in Western Sahara.

Shelef, Nadav G., and Yael Zeira. "Recognition Matters! UN State Status and Attitudes toward Territorial Compromise." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61.3 (2017): 537–563.

Shelef and Zeira demonstrate that the international recognition of statehood by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) influences mass attitudes of groups in conflict toward territorial compromise. The authors find that the effect of international recognition on mass attitudes is two-pronged: it simultaneously reduces mass support for concessions on the territorial terms of partition while raising support for partition as a strategy of conflict resolution.

Siroky, S. David, Milos Popovic, and Nikola Mirilovic. "Unilateral Secession, International Recognition, and Great Power Contestation." *Journal of Peace Research* (2020).

The authors ask why some states extend recognition to unilateral secessions quickly, while others delay it. The authors examine the Kosovo case and argue that great power influence and contestation is more likely to shape recognition decisions about Kosovo: Countries in the US sphere of influence are more likely to recognize Kosovo, whereas countries under Russian influence tend to delay their recognition of this new state-like entity.

Strategies of Secession

The strategies used by both central government and secessionist groups represent another key area of research. Some of this research has explored why some secessionist groups use violence, while others prefer nonviolence in their secessionist strategies, and whether one or the other is more effective and, if so, why and under which conditions. The literature has also examined whether the use of peaceful strategies during secession brings about peaceful relations after secession takes place. Finally, it has also analyzed why some secessionist groups tend to be more resilient, and has emphasized symbolic attachment to the land and religion as key factors.

From Nonviolence to Violence

Cunningham 2013 examines the determinants of strategy choice (violence versus nonviolence) for self-determination groups. Breslawski and Ives 2019 maintains that factions with strong religious ideologies have clearer incentives to use violence, since the use of violence allows them to show their religious credentials to transnational religious networks to get funding and resources. Griffiths and Wasser 2019 shows that violence rarely helps secessionist movements gain independence. Pischedda 2020 explores the conditions under which nonviolent resistance succeeds. Germann and Sambanis 2021 uses a two-step approach to assess the relationship between lost autonomy and political exclusion, on the one hand, and the emergence of nonviolent separatist claims and their escalation to violence, on the other hand. Balcells, et al. 2021 argues that, although secession tends to produce polarization along both ethnic group and policy lines, polarization does not necessarily lead to violence.

Balcells, Laia, José Fernández Albertos, and Alexander Kuo. *Secession and Social Polarization: Evidence from Catalonia*. No. 2021/2. WIDER Working Paper, United Nations University, 2021.

By using a panel survey and embedded experiments, the authors explore whether and if so how secessionism leads to social polarization. They suggest that secessionist conflicts are likely to polarize along both ethnic group and policy lines, although polarization doesn't necessarily bring violence.

Breslawski, Jori, and Brandon Ives. "Killing for God? Factional Violence on the Transnational Stage." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63.3 (2019): 617–643.

Breslawski and Ives ask why some factions fight for national self-determination by using more violence than other factions and argue that the factions with a strong religious ideology have incentives to use violence because the use of violence allows them to show their religious credentials to transnational networks to secure resources and funding.

Cunningham, Kathleen Gallagher. "Understanding Strategic Choice: The Determinants of Civil War and Nonviolent Campaign in Self-Determination Disputes." *Journal of Peace Research* 50.3 (2013): 291–304.

Cunningham asks when some self-determination disputes move into mass nonviolent campaigns, while others become civil wars, and some others stay within the realm of conventional politics. He finds that, compared to conventional politics, civil war is more likely to happen when self-determination groups have kin groups in adjoining states, face economic discrimination, demand independence, are internally fragmented, are larger, and function in countries with lower economic development level.

Germann, Micha, and Nicholas Sambanis. "Political Exclusion, Lost Autonomy, and Escalating Conflict over Self-Determination." *International Organization* 75.1(2021): 178–203.

By using a two-step approach, the authors examine if there are connections between lost autonomy and political exclusion, on the one hand, and the emergence of nonviolent separatist claims, on the other hand. Their analysis finds that both political exclusion and lost

autonomy are significantly correlated with the escalation of nonviolent claims for self-determination into violence, while lost autonomy is also a significant correlate of the emergence of nonviolent separatist claims.

Griffiths, Ryan, and Louis Wasser. "Does Violent Secessionism Work?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63.5 (2019): 1310–1336.

The authors introduces new data on all secessionist movements between 1900 and 2006, and on the institutional and extrainstitutional methods that secessionists have used from 1946 to 2011. It shows that no secessionist movement challenging a contiguous state has won its sovereignty without using institutional methods, either exclusively or in combination with extrainstitutional methods. In short, there is no evidence that violence helps a secessionist movement to gain independence.

Pischedda, Costantino. "Ethnic Conflict and the Limits of Nonviolent Resistance." *Security Studies* 29.2 (2020): 362–391.

Pischedda explores the conditions under which a nonviolent resistance succeeds and suggests that nonviolent resistance is more likely to be successful when the challengers and government share an ethnic identity.

Resilience and Coordination

Capoccia, et al. 2012 suggests that demands for autonomy or secession tend to be more resilient when religious organizations rather than nonreligious ones make these demands. Roeder 2018 asks how some secessionist campaigns draw attention to their agenda while others do not, and argues that the answer lies in the capability of campaigns to coordinate expectations within their population on a common purpose. Meanwhile, Kelle 2017 argues that minorities are more likely to call for self-rule when they attach symbolic meanings to their lands. Walter 2006 contends that groups seeking self-determination are more strategic than commonly thought.

Capoccia, Giovanni, Lawrence Sáez, and Eline De Rooij. "When State Responses Fail: Religion and Secessionism in India 1952–2002." *The Journal of Politics* 74.4 (2012): 1010–1022.

The study explores why some challenges to the territorial unity of democratic states are more tractable than others, and demonstrates that demands for autonomy or secession tend to be more resilient when religious organizations make these demands.

Kelle, Friederike Luise. "To Claim or Not To Claim? How Territorial Value Shapes Demands for Self-Determination." *Comparative Political Studies* 50.7 (2017): 992–1020.

This research maintains that groups are more likely to call for self-rule when they attach symbolic meaning to their territory than when they assign strategic or material relevance to their land because symbolic attachments have positive effects on group cohesion.

Roeder, Philip G. *National Secession: Persuasion and Violence in Independence Campaigns*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018.

Roeder asks how some secessionist campaigns draw attention to their agenda while others do not, and argues that the answer lies in the capability of campaigns to coordinate expectation within their population on a common purpose. The strategy of programmatic coordination makes independence the only viable option. He directs the study of secessionist movements from tactics including violence to wider substantive disputes where these tactics are selected.

Walter, Barbara F. "Information, Uncertainty, and the Decision to Secede." *International Organization* 60.1 (2006): 105–135.

Walter contends that groups seeking self-determination are more strategic than commonly thought. The challenging groups assess whether the government has given concessions in the past and if it is likely to do so in the future before issuing demands from the government.

Diffusion of Secessionist Conflicts

Forsberg 2013 discusses whether granting territorial concessions to separatist groups can create precedents for others. Cunningham 2017 examines why some countries are more likely to face self-determination movements, while others are not. Hentschel 2019 presents a formal theory of secession, which examines the trade-off between the costs and benefits of staying in a country versus seceding from it.

Cunningham, Kathleen. "Is Self-Determination Contagious? A Spatial Analysis of the Spread of Self-Determination Claims." *A Spatial Analysis of the Spread of Self-Determination Claims* 71.3 (2017): 585–604.

Cunningham explores why some states face self-determination claims, while others do not, and argues that ethnonational self-determination is one of many identities with which individuals can find affinity. The use of self-determination as a foundation for political claims diffuses regionally and this diffusion happens through observation of others using it as a basis of organization, generating a sense of legitimacy.

Forsberg, Erika. "Do Ethnic Dominoes Fall? Evaluating Domino Effects of Granting Territorial Concessions to Separatist Groups." *International Studies Quarterly* 57.2 (2013): 329–340.

Forsberg studies the idea that governmental granting of territorial concessions to secessionist groups might establish precedents for other groups, and suggests that two processes, the inspiration process (through the accommodation of an ethnic group's separatist demands) and the signaling process (through the acceptance of separatist demands) might make other groups more likely to pursue separatism.

Hentschel, Friedhelm. "Unraveling Secessions." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63.6 (2019): 1517–1541.

Hentschel introduces a formal theory of unraveling secessions. The theory gauges the trade-off between ethnic heterogeneity costs and economies of scale in the public good provision: while pursuing secession helps nonruling ethnic groups eliminate ethnic heterogeneity costs, leaving the country costs them economies of scale in the provision of public goods. Secession is thus expected to occur when there has been secession previously.

State Responses to Secession

State responses to secession, when not ignored, usually take one of two forms: repression or concession. Scholars have generally explored which factors lead to state repression and what conditions make state concession more likely. For instance, some studies have found that self-determination movements tend to receive concessions when they are internally divided. Others have examined both domestic and international factors to explain state behavior. Meanwhile, a number of studies have argued that states are less likely to grant concessions to secessionist movements because they are afraid that these concessions might set precedent for other groups seeking secession and might hurt their reputation. Several studies have tested this reputation theory of secession. While some research has found support, other studies indicate that, once selection effects are accounted for in the data, there is no evidence for the theory.

Repression and Concession

Cunningham 2011 finds that internally divided SD movements are more likely to receive concessions. Butt 2017 explores the strategies states use toward separatist movements. Lacina 2015 provides evidence that separatism is less likely among groups that are supported by the center over the neighboring groups in peripheral areas. Griffiths 2016 introduces a theory that accounts for the effect of domestic and international factors in shaping state response. Cederman, et al. 2017 explores whether ethnic conflict has decreased in the post-Cold War period. Lacina 2017 develops a three-sided interaction model, which suggests that the prime minister's relationship with rival regional interests determines whether regional groups will seek autonomy and the state will repress or accommodate demands for autonomy.

Butt, Ahsan I. *Secession and Security: Explaining State Strategy against Separatists*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2017.

This book explores the strategies states use toward separatist movements, and argues that external security shapes whether or not states use violence against secessionist movements. When its leaders believe that the potential state emerging from the secession will pose a greater threat to state security than the violent secession movement itself, then it is more likely to use violence in an effort to squelch it.

Cederman, L., K. S. Gleditsch, and Julian Wucherpfennig. "Predicting the Decline of Ethnic Conflict: Was Gurr Right, and for the Right Reasons?" *Journal of Peace Research* 54.2 (2017): 262–274.

The authors revisit diverging views on trends in ethnic conflict during the post–Cold War period. They find sufficient empirical support that Gurr was right about the decline of ethnic civil war and that it appears to diminish following compromise and accommodation.

Cunningham, Kathleen Gallagher. "Divide and Conquer or Divide and Concede: How Do States Respond to Internally Divided Separatists?" *American Political Science Review* 105.2 (2011): 275–297.

Cunningham aims to explain why states tend to make concessions to some self-determination movements (SDMs) while they do not offer concessions to others. The author explores the internal structures of these movements and finds that internally divided SDMs are more likely to receive concessions.

Griffiths, Ryan D. *Age of Secession*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2016.

Griffiths asks which factors influence the responses of central governments to independence demands and suggests how both domestic and international factors have shaped state responses and the proliferation of states since 1945.

Lacina, Bethany. "Periphery versus Periphery: The Stakes of Separatist War." *The Journal of Politics* 77.3 (2015): 692–706.

Lacina provides evidence that separatism is less likely among groups that are supported by the center over the neighboring groups in peripheral areas.

Lacina, Bethany. *Rival Claims: Ethnic Violence and Territorial Autonomy under Indian Federalism*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2017.

Lacina explores what determines whether regional elites will fight for autonomy and the state will repress or accommodate demands for autonomy. The author argues that the prime minister's electoral relationship with rival regional interests determines both the groups demands and the state's response, based on a three-way interaction between the center and peripheral rival interests.

Reputations and Dominoes

Walter 2006 and Walter 2009 discuss a reputational theory that suggests governments tend to refuse to reach negotiated settlements to save their reputations. Nilsson 2010 challenges the credibility of the theory. Griffiths 2015 argues that central governments use administrative lines and categories to resolve secession without fear of setting precedent for others and hurting their reputations. Sambanis, et al. 2018 test Walter's reputational theory of separatist conflict and find no empirical evidence for it.

Griffiths, Ryan D. "Between Dissolution and Blood: How Administrative Lines and Categories Shape Secessionist Outcomes." *International Organization* 69.3 (2015): 731–751.

Common wisdom posits that governments tend to oppose secessionist demands to prevent precedents for others and therefore choose blood over risking dissolution. Griffiths contends that administrative organization is a third option for states to handle secession demands: governments use administrative lines to decide for which regions they should recognize secession rights and for which regions they should not without fear of setting precedent for others and hurting their reputation.

Nilsson, Desirée. "Turning Weakness into Strength: Military Capabilities, Multiple Rebel Groups and Negotiated Settlements." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 27.3 (2010): 253–271.

Nilsson criticizes the theory of reputation and finds that weak rebel groups are more likely to reach a negotiated settlement with the government when the number of warring parties increases.

Sambanis, Nicholas, Micha Germann, and Andreas Schädel. "SDM: A New Data Set on Self-Determination Movements with an Application to the Reputational Theory of Conflict." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 62.3 (2018): 656–686.

Using their new data set on self-determination movements (SDMs), the authors test Walter's reputational theory of separatist conflict and find no empirical support for it.

Walter, Barbara F. "Building Reputation: Why Governments Fight Some Separatists but Not Others." *American Journal of Political Science* 50.2 (2006): 313–330.

Walter argues that reputation is an important factor when states decide whether they will accommodate or fight against the groups that attempt to secede. When there are many ethnic groups in a certain state, its leaders are less likely to cooperate with a challenging ethnic group.

Walter, Barbara F. *Reputation and Civil War: Why Separatist Conflicts Are So Violent*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Walter argues that, compared to other types of civil battles, conflicts over self-determination claims tend to escalate to war. They are characterized by a lack of settlement and negotiation, and it is argued that this is because governments refuse to sit for talks with early challengers in order to dissuade others from making more costly claims in the future.

Institutional Approaches to Secession

Studies have attempted to clarify whether territorial autonomy arrangements prevent or empower secessionists, and thereby deepen ethnic divisions. Recent work suggests that ethnic groups that have lost autonomy are more likely to mobilize for secession than groups that are currently autonomous or than those that have never experienced autonomous institutional arrangements. Scholars have examined the relationship between democratization, democracy, and secession. Others have focused on the legacies of the Soviet Union to explain secessionist outbreaks in postcommunist areas.

Autonomy and Secession

Hechter and Okamoto 2001 concentrates on mechanisms that produce minority group collective action. Cornell 2002 maintains that granting autonomy to ethnic groups is not a solution to ethnic conflict because it increases secessionist trends. Siroky and Cuffe 2015 demonstrates that those ethnic groups that have lost autonomy are more likely to mobilize for secession than groups that are currently autonomous or than those that have never experienced autonomous institutional arrangements. Anderson and Costa 2016 argue that the differential survival rate of ethnic autonomy arrangements (EAAs) is in part the result of variations within their internal structure. Cederman, et al. 2015 clarifies whether territorial autonomy arrangements prevent or empower secessionists. Siroky, et al. 2021 shows that autonomy demands and nationalism can be contained, even in culturally distinct areas, through the use of indirect rule.

Anderson, Liam, and Carlos Costa. "Survival of the Fittest: Explaining the Success of Ethnic Autonomy Arrangements." In *Special Issue: Centre-Periphery Bargaining in the Age of Democracy*. Edited by David S. Siroky, Sean Mueller, and Michael Hechter. *Swiss Political Science Review* 22.4 (2016): 516–544.

The authors argue that differential survival rate of ethnic autonomy arrangements (EAAs) is in part the result of variations within their internal structure. EAAs are more likely to survive if they are structured to establish and sustain equilibrium in bargaining relations between periphery and the center. However, if these relations are unbalanced, EAAs are less likely to survive.

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Simon Hug, Andreas Schädel, and Julian Wucherpfennig. "Territorial Autonomy in the Shadow of Future Conflict: Too Little, Too Late?" *American Political Science Review* 109.2 (2015): 354–370.

This article brings more clarity to the debate over whether territorial autonomy arrangements prevent or empower secessionists and deepen ethnic divisions. It provides empirical evidence that both types of governance have a strong conflict-preventing impact on circumstances where there is no previous dispute history.

Cornell, S. E. "Autonomy as a Source of Conflict: Caucasian Conflicts in Theoretical Perspective." *World Politics* 54.2 (2002): 245–276.

Based on empirical evidence from the South Caucasus, Cornell argues that granting autonomy to ethnic minorities in conflict does not resolve the conflict but increases the likelihood of the conflict since autonomy promotes separate identities among minority groups and increases their willingness and capacity to seek secession.

Hechter, Michael, and Dina Okamoto. "Political Consequences of Minority Group Formation." *Annual Review of Political Science* 4.1 (2001): 189–215.

Hechter and Okamoto focus on mechanisms that produce minority group collective action, which is shaped by prevention of free riding, establishment of institutional arrangements producing demand for greater autonomy, and development of distinctive social identities.

Siroky, David S., and John Cuffe. "Lost Autonomy, Nationalism and Separatism." *Comparative Political Studies* 48.1 (2015): 3–34.

The authors aim to resolve the debate about whether ethnic groups with autonomous institutional arrangements are more or less likely to pursue secession than those without autonomy, and suggest groups that have lost autonomy tend to have both strong capacity and incentive to pursue secession, whereas those that have never experienced autonomous institutional arrangements are unlikely to mobilize because they lack collective action capacity.

Siroky, David S., Sean Mueller, Andre Fazi, and Michael Hechter. "Containing Nationalism: Culture, Economics and Indirect Rule in Corsica." *Comparative Political Studies* 54.6 (2021): 1023–1057

This article examines how culture, institutions, and economics influence center–periphery relations, specifically the demand for autonomy and nationalist parties, utilizing new, disaggregated data and an original survey from the French island of Corsica. Indirect rulers have managed to contain nationalist parties in culturally distinct communities, specifically those that are more dependent on public funds. Largely where a thriving private sector offers alternatives to state dependence, lessening the force of indirect rule, is cultural distinctiveness associated with nationalist voting.

Democracy and Secession

Buhaug 2006 evaluates the relationship between secession, conflict, and democracy. Giuliano 2006 argues that the democratization process, with its transfer of accountability from federal capital to the region, promotes secessionism because regional leaders now have more incentives to seek secession in response to local constituencies in order to gain their support to stay in office.

Buhaug, Halvard. "Relative Capability and Rebel Objective in Civil War." *Journal of Peace Research* 43.6 (2006): 691–708.

Buhaug examines several assumptions regarding when aggrieved groups of society tend to secede or overthrow the ruling government. His analysis demonstrates that different causal mechanisms shape territorial and governmental conflicts. He finds that the parabolic relationship between the risk of civil war and democracy holds in case of state-centered conflicts, whereas the risk of territorial rebellion is positively and near-linearly associated with democracy.

Giuliano, Elise. "Secessionism from the Bottom Up: Democratization, Nationalism, and Local Accountability in the Russian Transition." *World Politics* 58.2 (2006): 276–310.

Using empirical evidence from the Russian Federation, Giuliano argues that ethno-federal countries experiencing democratization are more likely to experience secessionism because regional leaders at that point have more incentives to seek secession in response to local constituencies in order to gain their support and stay in office.

The Fall of Federations

Roeder 1991 evaluates the rise of assertive ethno-federalism over the past three decades in the Soviet Union. Hale 2000 examines why some ethnic regions put in more efforts to achieve secession, whereas others strove to save the same multinational state, and Hale 2008 argues that while ethnic politics is about interests, psychological processes shape ethnicity. Gorenburg 2003 examines the spread of nationalism in the late Soviet Union and the early Russian Federation. Giuliano 2006 stresses that the democratization process encourages regional leaders to seek secession. Smith 2013 examines the legacies of Soviet ethno-federalism that catalyzed secession and separatist wars. Giuliano 2011 reexamines why ethnic groups mobilized in some Russian republics but not in others after the fall of Soviet Union. Grigoryan 2012 criticizes the argument that the ethno-federal designs of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia were at the root of the violent conflicts after the breakup of the countries. Daly 2014 finds that coercive capacities of the Soviet successor states and the demographics of minority groups in these states better explain state policies toward ethnic minorities.

Daly, Sarah Zukerman. "State Strategies in Multi-Ethnic Territories: Explaining Variation in the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc." *British Journal of Political Science* 44.2 (2014): 381–408.

Daly examines what explains state policies toward ethnic minorities in twenty-seven successor states of the Soviet Union. By contrast to expectations that successor states would repress groups that are likely to threaten their territorial integrity, the author finds that minority demographics and state coercive capacities better explain state policies toward ethnic minorities. The author further demonstrates the importance of Soviet multinational legacies in determining minority rights.

Giuliano, Elise. "Secessionism from the Bottom Up: Democratization, Nationalism, and Local Accountability in the Russian Transition." *World Politics* 58.2 (2006): 276–310.

Using empirical evidence from the Russian Federation, Giuliano argues that ethno-federal countries experiencing democratization are more likely to experience secession because regional leaders gained incentives to seek secession in response to local constituencies who demanded it and whose support they needed to stay in office.

Giuliano, Elise. *Constructing Grievance: Ethnic Nationalism in Russia's Republics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011.

Giuliano reexamines why ethnic groups mobilized in some Russian republics but not in others after the fall of Soviet Union. The author argues that the previous explanations based on religion, language, cultural difference, demography, and regional economic development fall flat. The ability of nationalist leaders in persuading others to link their material interests to the fate of the nation is what led to mobilization in some Russian republics but not others.

Gorenburg, Dmitry P. *Minority Ethnic Mobilization in the Russian Federation*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Gorenburg examines the spread of nationalism in the late Soviet Union and the early Russian Federation, and argues that the Soviet state structure played a primary role in the rise of nationalist movements across the Communist world. The author demonstrates that preexisting ethnic institutions influenced what tactics the secessionist movement leaders used.

Grigoryan, Arman. "Ethnofederalism, Separatism, and Conflict: What Have We Learned from the Soviet and Yugoslav Experiences?" *International Political Science Review* 33.5 (2012): 520–538.

Grigoryan criticizes the argument that the ethno-federal designs of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia were at the root of the violent conflicts after the breakup of the countries and contends that the ethno-federal designs in these countries were themselves the results

of previous nationalist mobilizations in the Russian empire and the Balkans.

Hale, Henry E. "The Parade of Sovereignties: Testing Theories of Secession in the Soviet Setting." *British Journal of Political Science* 30.1 (2000): 31–56.

Hale examines why some ethnic regions put in more efforts to achieve secession, whereas others strive to save the same multinational state. His empirical results demonstrate that regions are more likely to be separatist when they possess the most wealth, have the least assimilated ethnic groups, and already have the greatest levels of autonomy.

Hale, Henry E. *The Foundations of Ethnic Politics: Separatism of States and Nations in Eurasia and the World*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Hale asks why ethnicity is a key component of political conflict and why groups seek secession. Through an analysis of events that brought about the fall of Soviet Union, he demonstrates the argument that while ethnic politics is about interests, ethnicity and ethnic identity are about psychological processes, especially uncertainty reduction.

Roeder, Philip G. "Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization." *World Politics: A Quarterly Journal of International Relations* 43.2 (1991): 196–232.

Roeder evaluates the rise of assertive ethno-federalism over the past three decades in the Soviet Union by focusing on several issues, including on the role of federal institutions in protests, and the assertiveness of relatively advantaged ethnic groups.

Smith, Benjamin. "Separatist Conflict in the Former Soviet Union and Beyond: How Different Was Communism?" *World Politics* 65.2 (2013): 350–381.

In this review article, Smith focuses on how the legacies of Soviet ethno-federalism catalyzed secession and separatist wars.

Solutions to Secession

Debates about potential solutions to secessionist conflicts form an essential part of the literature. One solution scholars and policymakers have repeatedly put forward is partition, but its effects are disputed. Some research has argued that partition is an effective solution to end violence when it is implemented in a complete form. Others have contended that partition is not an effective solution. Another solution for secessionist conflicts has focused on institutional arrangements, including federalism, autonomy, and particularly decentralization, which some believe can help to alleviate secessionist conflicts. Still other scholars have looked at the role of international entities in solving secessionist conflicts.

Partition and Peace

Horowitz 2000 presupposes that certain preconditions make partition successful. Kaufmann 1998 suggests partition is a good solution to secessionist conflict, but only when it is implemented completely. Sambanis 2000 and Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl 2009 push back and argue that the arguments in favor of partition are empirically ill founded and that partition is unlikely to end conflict. Tir 2005 argues that ethnic territorial disputes are more likely to lead to conflict onset than economic or strategic disputes. Chapman and Roeder 2007 explains why partition is more likely to preserve and facilitate democratization compared to unitarism, de facto separation, and autonomy arrangements. Johnson 2015 suggests that strong state institutions are more important than partition in providing enduring peace because the institutions establish incentives for the ethnic minorities to collaborate with the state.

Chapman, Thomas, and Philip G. Roeder. "Partition as a Solution to Wars of Nationalism: The Importance of Institutions." *American Political Science Review* 101.4 (2007): 677–691.

The authors focus on a theory of domestic political institutions to explain why partition is more likely to preserve and facilitate democratization compared to unitarism, de facto separation, and autonomy arrangements.

Horowitz, Donald L. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000.

In this updated edition with a new preface, Horowitz argues that the rise of ethnic conflict is inversely related to the proliferation of democracy in the developing world. He also presupposes that certain preconditions make partition successful when regions being established have a high degree of ethnic homogeneity, defection forces are willing to express support for partition, and the partition movement receives external support.

Johnson, Carter. "Keeping the Peace after Partition: Ethnic Minorities, Civil Wars, and the Third-Generation Ethnic Security Dilemma." *Civil Wars* 17.1 (2015): 25–50.

Johnson examines ethnic security dilemma theory and argues that strong state institutions are more likely to produce enduring peace than partition because these institutions provide incentives for the ethnic minorities to cooperate with the state. By contrast, ethnic minorities have more opportunities to defect when state institutions are weak. The author evaluates this argument by comparing post-partition Georgia–Abkhazia with post-partition Moldova–Transnistria.

Kaufmann, Chaim D. "When All Else Fails: Ethnic Population Transfers and Partitions in the Twentieth Century." *International Security* 23.2 (1998): 120–156.

Kaufmann examines partition cases in Cyprus, North Ireland, India, Pakistan, and Palestine and Israel, and argues that the high-level violence in these partition cases was not because of partition in general, but due to the fact that partition in these countries was incomplete.

Sambanis, Nicholas. "Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War: An Empirical Critique of the Theoretical Literature." *World Politics* 52.4 (2000): 437–483.

Sambanis conducts the first-large-n analysis of partition theory, which claims that partition is the only solution to a conflict when there is high level of violence among groups in conflict; his empirical test demonstrates that there is little support for partition theory.

Sambanis, Nicholas, and Jonah Schulhofer-Wohl. "What's in a Line? Is Partition a Solution to Civil War?" *International Security* 34.2 (2009): 82–118.

The authors ask if partition helps to end civil wars and the empirical analysis of their new dataset demonstrates that partition is unlikely to diminish the risk of a return to civil war.

Tir, Jaroslav. "Keeping the Peace after Secession: Territorial Conflicts between Rump and Secessionist States." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49.5 (2005): 713–741.

Tir examines the results of all twentieth-century secessions and finds that ethnically based territorial disputes play a much greater role in conflict onset than do their economically or strategically based counterparts. His results also demonstrate that peaceful secessions lead to peaceful relations among the sides after secession takes place.

Decentralization

Brancati 2009 asks why political decentralization reduces intrastate conflict in some states but not in others, and argues that the electoral strength of regional parties determines whether decentralization will be effective in diminishing intrastate violence. Bakke 2015 contends that some forms of decentralized governance including regional autonomy arrangements and federalism do not always preserve peace in states facing self-determination demands. De la Calle 2015 suggests that the nationalists in different regions of developed countries tend to resort to violence when their regions are ignored by political elites. Flamand 2019 explores the conditions under which partial decentralization can mitigate conflict

Bakke, Kristin M. *Decentralization and Intrastate Struggles: Chechnya, Punjab, and Québec*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

Bakke contends that some forms of decentralized governance including regional autonomy arrangements and federalism do not always preserve peace in states facing self-determination demands. Whether these institutions will be effective in preserving peace depends on traits of societies they govern. Different ethnic and economic characteristics determine if these institutions will work.

Brancati, Dawn. *Peace by Design: Managing Intrastate Conflict through Decentralization*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Brancati asks why political decentralization reduces intrastate conflict in some states but not in others and argues that the electoral strength of regional parties determines whether decentralization will be effective in diminishing intrastate violence. The author demonstrates that regional parties play an essential role in promoting interstate conflict by establishing regional identities and mobilizing groups to get involved in conflict.

De la Calle, Luis. *Nationalist Violence in Postwar Europe*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

De la Calle conducts a multimethod study of the Basque country, Catalonia, Corsica, Northern Ireland, Sardinia, and Wales and explores why nationalist violence occurs in developed countries. The author suggests that the unresponsive political elites and the fact that nationalists have been blocked in attracting supporters through legal channels lead them to use violence. Political elites tend to be unresponsive to regional nationalists, whose regions have a negligible impact on political elites' staying in power.

Flamand, Sabine. "Partial Decentralization as a Way to Prevent Secessionist Conflict." *European Journal of Political Economy* 59 (2019): 159–178.

Flamand explores the conditions under which partial decentralization can mitigate conflict and argues that although the likelihood of a successful secession grows with heterogeneity, it expands under a condition of income inequality among regions if and only if the union is socially efficient at the start. The range of decentralization levels compatible with peace always exists, if the costs of diversity diminish proportionally with decentralization.

Datasets on Secession and Secessionist Movements

Gurr 1993a and Gurr, et al. 1993b discuss their Minorities at Risk (MAR) data projects, while Birnir, et al. 2015 and Birnir, et al. 2018 identify selection bias in MAR data and present the All Minorities at Risk (AMAR) dataset. Cederman, et al. 2010 uses a new dataset on ethnic power relations (EPR) and examines the incidences of armed conflict as the result of ethnonationalist demands to state power. Vogt, et al. 2015 presents the new Family of Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) datasets, version 2014. Griffiths 2015 introduces a new list of proto-states, and Griffiths and Wasser 2019 a new list of secessionist types. Siroky and Hale 2017 provides a new dataset on all actual and potential irredentist cases from 1946 to 2014. Sambanis, et al. 2018 introduces a new data set on self-determination movements (SDMs).

Birnir, Jóhanna K., David D. Laitin, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, David M. Waguespack, Agatha S. Hultquist, and Ted R. Gurr. "Introducing the AMAR (All Minorities at Risk) Data." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 62.1 (2018): 203–226.

The authors present All Minorities at Risk (AMAR) data, the dataset of socially recognized and salient ethnic groups, which allows scholars to conduct data analysis free from selection bias issues that have been present in the study of ethnic conflict. Based on their bias-corrected data, the authors also suggest some directions for scholars.

Birnir, Jóhanna K., Jonathan Wilkenfeld, James D. Fearon, et al. "Socially Relevant Ethnic Groups, Ethnic Structure, and AMAR." *Journal of Peace Research* 52.1 (2015): 110–115.

The authors construct a new list of ethnic groups in a dataset called AMAR, in which they enumerate subgroups of commonly recognized groups.

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min. "Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel? New Data and Analysis." *World Politics* 62.1 (2010): 87–119.

The authors introduce a new dataset on Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) that addresses several shortcomings in previous datasets. This new dataset identifies all politically relevant ethnic groups and provides information about their access to central state power from 1946 until 2005.

Griffiths, Ryan D. "Between Dissolution and Blood: How Administrative Lines and Categories Shape Secessionist Outcomes." *International Organization* 69. 3 (2015): 731–751.

Introduces new data on proto-states to show that governments use administrative lines to decide the regions where they should recognize secession rights and the regions where they should not, without fear of setting precedent for others and hurting their reputation.

Griffiths, Ryan, and Louis Wasser. "Does Violent Secessionism Work?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63.5 (2019): 1310–1336.

The authors explore the strategic use of violence by secessionist movements using an original dataset on the institutional and extrainstitutional methods that secessionist groups have practiced during the period of 1946–2011. The authors find that success of a strategy used by secessionists depends on context and that no secessionist movement challenging a contiguous state has succeeded in obtaining its sovereignty without employing institutional methods, either exclusively or in combination with extrainstitutional methods. Their findings in overall demonstrate that there is no empirical support that the use violence is helpful to secessionist movements to get independent.

Gurr, Ted Robert. *Minorities At Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993a.

Ted Gurr's book comprehensively reviews the Minorities at Risk Project, which provides data on more than two hundred politically active ethnic and communal groups.

Gurr, Ted Robert, Barbara Harff, Monty G. Marshall, and James R. Scarritt. *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993b.

The authors discuss the Minorities at Risk project, which provides data on some important issues such as discrimination against ethnic minorities, their grievances, rebellious activities, and levels of political mobilization. This dataset has been a common standard data recourse for the scholarly studies on protest, ethnic mobilization, and ethnic group rebellion.

Sambanis, Nicholas, Micha Germann, and Andreas Schädel. "SDM: A New Data Set on Self-Determination Movements with an Application to the Reputational Theory of Conflict." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 62.3 (2018): 656–686.

In this article, the authors introduce a new dataset on self-determination movements (SDMs). The dataset covers SDMs from 1945 to 2012 and corrects selection bias that has been prevalent in previous SDMs datasets. Using their new dataset, the authors test the reputational theory of separatist conflict and find no empirical support for it.

Siroky, David S., and Christopher W. Hale. "Inside Irredentism: A Global Empirical Analysis." *American Journal of Political Science* 61.1 (2017): 117–128.

Based on a triadic structure of kin groups in the irredentist state, its coethnic enclave, and the host state, Siroky and Hale explore why some states seek irredentism. To answer this question, the authors present a new dataset on all actual and potential irredentist cases during 1946–2014. Their results demonstrate that a state tends to pursue irredentism when the kin group is near economic parity with other groups in its own state and when the state is ethnically homogeneous and has a winner-take-all majoritarian political system.

Vogt, Manuel, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Rügger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker, and Luc Girardin. "Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Dataset Family." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59.7 (2015): 1327–1342.

In this article, the authors present the new Family of Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) datasets, version 2014. This new version extends temporal coverage from 2009 to 2013 and provides several new features, including a new measure of regional autonomy and a new dataset component coding intraethnic identities and cleavages.

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